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Intro: corporate mobile computing 
Opportunities 
• Consumerisation 
• BYOD 
• New application scenarios 
 
Threats 
• Greyware and malware 
• Theft and loss 
 
Risk 
Compromise of sensitive data 
Intro: data protection in Android 
1.0 sandboxed internal app storage 
1.6 certificate and private key store 
• system only 
• no public APIs 
2.2 Device Administration API 
 (password restrictions, remote wiping,…) 
2.3 Content Providers 
• Sharing of structured data 
• Dynamic permission granting and revocation 
3.0 Filesystem encryption 
• Not by default 
• External storage unencrypted 
Intro: data protection in Android 
4.0 KeyChain 
• System-wide private key and certificate store 
• User consent for import and use 
• Public API 
4.3 Android KeyStore Provider 
• App-specific 
• Standard Java API 
Hardware-backed RSA keys 
4.4 Restricted external storage 
• Private, per app 
• Read permission for shared part 
 
Motivation: other technologies and evolutions 
Samsung KNOX for Android 
• OS isolation 
(application containers) 
• Container encryption 
• Requires TrustZone-enabled Samsung devices 
Upcoming Android L release 
• Integration of KNOX features 
• Encryption by default 
Motivation: security concerns 
Filesystem encryption 
• Currently not by default 
• Hardware backing not used (only user secret) 
• No application control 
External storage 
• Not encrypted 
• Residual data from apps 
• Pre-4.4: readable by all apps 
Motivation: corporate Android? 
• Significant: ≈79% market share (2013, Q3) 
• Fragmentation 
o Low- vs. high-end devices 
o OS versions 
o OEM customisations 
• BYOD: devices need level playing field 
Requirements 
Security 
• Prevent brute-force and dictionary 
attacks against user secret 
• Withstand rooting after theft 
• Reduce asset exposure 
• Automation and contextual policies 
Requirements 
Interoperability 
• Unmodified OS 
• Unmodified apps 
• Support wide device range and Android base 
Usability 
• No substantial overhead to user 
(e.g. long, complex passphrase) 
General approach 
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Secure storage module 
Secure storage: protocol constituents 
• 1 keypair SKSE,PKSE 
 
• 1 passcode KSE,A  per app 
 
• 1 symmetric encryption key per app 
• SE public key PKSE 
 
• App-specific passcode KSE,A 
Trusted OS   rely on private application 
 storage to store KSE,A 
Secure storage: protocol flow 
2: prompt for 
passcode 
3: passcode 
1: Ksession AuthKeyAgreement 
6: authentication successful 
7: request decryption key KD 
8: return KD 
9: retrieve encrypted data 
10: decrypt 
data with KD 
5: verify(passcode,         ) 
4: {passcode,     }Ksession 
Secure storage: app enrollment 
Distribution of KSE,A 
• Option 1: enrollment PUK 
o User enters PUK 
o Secure element generates KSE,A 
o KSE,A released to new app 
• Option 2: MDM server 
MDM server 
General approach 
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Context-awareness module 
Context-aware module: purpose 
Assistive technology 
• Automate user actions 
• Relieve user from management burden 
• Auto-download, auto-delete, … 
Soft security 
• Limit residual data 
• Reduce asset exposure 
• Controlled provisioning to apps 
Context-aware module: policy examples 
If location 
offsite “Residence of patient X” 
OR unused > 1hour 
Then Remove “DoorCredential X” 
 
 
 
 
If 8:00 ≤ time ≤ 18:00 
Then App.Contract has R/W-access to 
“Contract Z” 
Integration: option 1 
Each app manages its own assets 
• Less complex setup 
• Requires cooperation from developer 
• Typically: in-house corporate apps 
App 1 App 2 App 3 
Integration: option 2 
Dedicated app manages and provisions assets 
• Allows centralised policy administration 
• No changes to client apps 
• Suitable for 3rd party apps 
Dedicated app 
Client app 1 
Client app 2 
Context 
OK? 
Prototype: corporate file mgmt 
Mobile component (option 2) 
• Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 with Android 4.1.2 
• Secure storage module 
o G&D Mobile Security Card 1.0 with SEEK4Android 
o Java-based symmetric crypto (BouncyCastle 1.47) 
o C-based symmetric crypto (PolarSSL 1.3.2) 
o C-based version up to 5 times faster 
• Context-aware module 
o Automated tasks: Android Service 
o File provisioning: Android Content Provider 
• File access by URI 
• Dynamic permission granting and revocation 
Prototype: corporate file mgmt 
File server 
• Apache Commons Net 3.2 
• Legacy protocol: FTP over TLS 
• Client authentication (X.509) 
MDM server 
• Policy creation and update 
• Push: 
o to file server 
o to affected mobiles 
o file conflict resolution on mobile 
• Google Cloud Messaging 
Evaluation: assumptions 
• Authenticated user is trusted! 
• OS security mechanisms correctly 
enforced during legitimate use 
(no prior malware infection) 
• User does not weaken platform security 
o No rooting 
o ADB disabled 
o Bootloader locked 
Evaluation: attack countermeasures 
Attack 1: rooting and doing a dictionary or brute-force 
attack on the device 
• Android 
o Pre-4.4: PBKDF2 (weak) 
o 4.4+: Scrypt (stronger) 
• iOS 
o PBKDF2 (weak) 
o Hardware-based delay 
• Android with our solution 
o Tamperproof storage of decryption keys 
o Passcode attempts limited 
Evaluation: attack countermeasures 
Attack 2: dumping flash memory and doing a dictionary 
or brute-force attack offline 
• Android 
o Pre-4.4: PBKDF2 (weak) 
o 4.4+: Scrypt (stronger) 
• iOS 
o Hardware-backed encryption 
• Android with our solution 
o Hardware-backed encryption with tamperproof 
hardware 
Evaluation: attack countermeasures 
Attack 3: app exhausting the passcode attempt limit by 
repeated tries 
• Android: n/a 
• iOS: n/a 
• Android with our solution 
o App must be enrolled to secure element 
(resulting in app passcode KSE,A) 
o Passcode attempt only counted if KSE,A verifies 
Evaluation: discussion 
• Data on external storage also encrypted 
• Unmodified OS 
• Suitable for 3rd party apps 
• Accomodates wide range of devices and Android versions 
o Content Provider: requires Android 2.3+ 
o Multiple options for SE: - µSD-based 
 - embedded 
 - contactless NFC card 
o  may need extra hardware, depending on device 
• Passcode attempt limit  short passcode (PIN) sufficient 
Conclusions 
• Android data protection 
o Fragmentation! 
o Filesystem encryption not hardware-backed 
o External storage exposed 
• Android with our solution: 
o Secure storage module with tamperproof key storage 
o Context-aware module with reduced asset exposure 
o Centralised, policy-based asset mgmt 
• Future work 
o Trustworthy passcode entry 
o Integration in Android KeyStore Provider 
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